I know it feels scary, but the current economic mess is not unprecedented. The exact details of it are all new (hence the scary part) but the general outline is as old as capitalism. Here’s a brief review of Jim’s current most-recommended book: Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (5th Edition) by Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber (ISBN 978-0-471-46714-4). The book covers the history of financial panics around the world from Kipper-und-Wipperzeit of 1619-1622 and the Dutch tulip bulb episode in 1636-1637 through the Asian collapse in 1997 as well as the Russian default and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 and the corporate scandals of 2001-2003 (Enron, Worldcom and so on). It was first published in 1978; the current 5th edition was published in 2005. Undoubtedly a new edition is in the works!
So, everything from here on is me quoting the book with my own comments in italics.
“The features of…manias are never identical and yet there is a similar pattern. The increase in prices of commodities or real estate or stock is associated with euphoria; household wealth increases and so does spending. There is a sense of ‘We never had it so good.’ Then the asset prices peak, and then begin to decline.” [page 10]
And remember, this has happened historically all over the world, not just in the U.S.
“The big ten financial bubbles [It will be interesting to see which one gets dropped in Edition 6!]
1. The Dutch Tulip Bulb Bubble 1636
2. The South Sea Bubble 1720
3. The Mississippi Bubble 1720
4. The late 1920s stock price bubble 1927-29
5. The surge in bank loans to Mexico and other developing countries in the 1970s
6. The bubble in real estate and stocks in Japan 1985-89
7. The 1985-89 bubble in real estate and stocks in Finland, Norway and Sweden
8. The bubble in real estate and stocks in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and several other Asian countries in 1992-97
9. The surge in foreign investment in Mexico 1990-93
10. The bubble in over-the-counter stocks in the Unites States 1995-2000” [page 8]
Some speakers I have heard (remember, I hang out with economists a LOT) have mentioned the resemblance of the current mania/panic to the one in Japan in 1985-89. This is not good as Japan has never done what it needs to do to fully get over the thing. Their stock market has never recovered (the high was around 39,000 in 1989, it had gotten back to about 14,000 before this panic and is now running around 8,000).
“During the mania the increases in the prices of real estate or stocks or in one or several commodities contribute to increases in consumption and investment spending that in turn forecast perpetual economic growth.” [page 9]
Do you remember hearing that house prices can’t fall? That the run-up in prices was due to demand pressures and that they would continue? I don’t think the stock price problem is the same however. Stocks are going down simply(?) because of the panic. They may have been slightly overpriced according to historic averages of P/Es but the sell-off is strictly a panic response to the loss of confidence in the global financial system.
“During these euphoric periods an increasing number of investors seek short-term capital gains from the increases in the prices of real estate and of stocks rather than from the investment income based on the productive use of these assets. Individuals make down payments on condo apartments in the pre-construction phase of the developments in the anticipation that they will be able to sell these apartments at handsome profits when the buildings have been completed.” [page 9]
Well, doggone, this is EXACTLY what happened in one of the two hardest hit areas of foreclosures, namely the Sun Belt. There was a lot of speculation or purchase of second homes and these are the places that are being foreclosed. The other area of many foreclosures is the Rust Belt and that’s caused more by the basic economic factors of higher unemployment and generally depressed incomes of people who were able to get mortgages in the time of “easy credit.”
“When asset prices tumble sharply, the surge in the demand for liquidity may drive many individuals and firms into bankruptcy, and the sale of assets in these distressed circumstances may induce further declines in asset prices. At such times a lender of last resort can provide financial stability or attenuate financial instability. [page 13]
This is the reason the Fed and Treasury and the world’s central banks have stepped in to add massive amounts of liquidity and “save” some firms whose defaults would have caused even more massive disruptions to the world financial system.
“The dilemma is that if investors knew in advance that governmental support would be forthcoming under generous dispensations when asset prices fall sharply, markets might break down somewhat more frequently because investors will be less cautious in their purchases of assets and of securities.” [page 13]
This is called ‘moral hazard’ and it’s the reason that the Fed did not do anything to save Lehman Brothers. It is a very tricky business to decide what to save and what to let fail.
“The standard model of the sequence of events that leads to financial crises is that a shock leads to an economic expansion that then morphs into an economic boom; euphoria develops and then there is a pause in the increase in asset prices. Distress is likely to follow as asset prices begin to decline. The pattern is biological in regularity. A panic is likely and then a crash may follow.” [page 77]
The problem with this panic was that the quicker and larger the helping response was from the world’s central banks, the more people panicked, I guess assuming that if the governments are doing so much to fix things, they must REALLY be broken. It’s perfectly possible that the real estate bubble might have deflated slowly, without a panic and without taking the stock market with it if there hadn’t been the complication of the mortgage-backed security problem.
“The change in the mind-sets of investors from confidence to pessimism is the source of instability in the credit markets as some borrowers—individuals as well as firms—realize that their indebtedness is too large relative to their incomes. These borrowers begin to adjust to their new perceptions about the economic future by reducing their spending so they will have the cast to pay down debt or to increase saving. Some firms may sell divisions and operating units to get the cash to pay down debt. The lenders recognize that they have too many risky loans and so they seek repayment of outstanding loans from borrowers that they deem most risky; they become reluctant to renew these loans as they mature. The lenders also raise the credit standard for new loans.” [pages 77-78]
Egads. This sounds like a news story from this morning’s paper and not something written in 1978 (I’m betting this paragraph was written in the first edition). So, like I said, IT’S NOT NEW!!!